Abstract-Content distribution via the Internet is becoming increasingly popular. To be cost-effective, commercial content providers are now using peer-to-peer (P2P) protocols such as BitTorrent to save bandwidth costs and to handle peak demands. When an online content provider uses a P2P protocol, it faces an incentive issue: how to motivate its clients to upload to their peers. This paper presents Dandelion, a system designed to address this issue. Unlike previous incentive-compatible systems, such as BitTorrent, our system provides non-manipulable incentives for clients to upload to their peers. A client that honestly uploads to its peers is rewarded in the following two ways. First, if its peers are unable to reciprocate its uploads, the content provider rewards the client's service with credit. This credit can be redeemed for discounts on paid content or other monetary rewards. Second, if the client's peers possess content of interest and have appropriate uplink capacity, the client is rewarded with reciprocal uploads from its peers. In designing Dandelion, we trade scalability for the ability to provide robust incentives for cooperation. The evaluation of our prototype system on PlanetLab demonstrates the viability of our approach. A Dandelion server that runs on commodity hardware with a moderate access link is capable of supporting up to a few thousand clients. The download completion time for these clients is substantially reduced due to the additional upload capacity offered by strongly incentivized uploaders.
I. INTRODUCTION

C
ONTENT distribution via the Internet is becoming increasingly popular among the entertainment industry and the consumers alike. An attractive approach for commercial online content distribution is the use of peer-to-peer (P2P) protocols. This approach does not require a content provider to over-provision its bandwidth to handle peak demands, nor does it require the provider to rely solely on purchased service from a third-party such as Akamai. Instead, a P2P protocol such as BitTorrent [1] harnesses its clients' unused uplink bandwidth, and saves the bandwidth and computing resources of a con- tent provider. Huang et al. [2] showed that peer-assisted content distribution can substantially reduce the operating costs of Video on Demand services. To that effect, BBC has successfully launched its iPlayer peer-assisted VoD service and leading content providers have now partnered with BitTorrent, Inc. [3] . This trend indicates that P2P protocols enable a site to cost-effectively distribute content.
When an online content provider uses a P2P protocol, it faces an incentive issue: how to motivate clients that possess content to upload to others. This issue is of paramount importance because the performance of a P2P network is highly dependent on the users' willingness to contribute their uplink bandwidth. In addition, in a competitive market, a content provider with paying customers needs to offer better quality of service guarantees than the ones offered by free P2P content distribution systems. However, selfish (rational) users tend not to share their bandwidth without external incentives [4] . Although the popular BitTorrent protocol, has incorporated the rate-based tit-for-tat incentive mechanism, this mechanism bears two weaknesses. First and foremost, it does not encourage clients to seed, i.e., to upload to other peers after completing the file download. Second, it is vulnerable to manipulation [5] - [8] , allowing modified clients to free-ride and still achieve download rates equal to or higher than the ones of cooperative clients (Sections II-B and VI-C).
In previous work [9] , we introduced Dandelion, a protocol that provides provably non-manipulable incentives for seeding and is not susceptible to free-riding. Although the protocol was shown to be sufficiently scalable, its incentive mechanism was completely centralized. In this paper, we built upon our initial design and propose changes that partially decentralize the protocol. These changes render Dandelion more scalable, while they maintain its original desirable properties. Our modified protocol provides robust incentives using two mechanisms.
The first mechanism, credit-based-exchange, guarantees strict fair-exchange of content uploads for real monetary value. This mechanism is useful when a client has content that interests its peer but the peer has no content of interest to reciprocate with. Selfish clients (i.e., rational clients that do not upload unless they expect to be rewarded) earn credit when they upload valid content to their peers. Credit can be redeemed at a content provider for discounts on the content or for other types of monetary awards. Given appropriate pricing schemes, we expect that a selfish client is motivated to serve content to its peers. The second mechanism, Tit-for-tat-based (TFT-based) exchange, renders the protocol more scalable by partially decentralizing it. It enables clients that are mutually interested in each other's content to barter their uplink bandwidth.
1063-6692/$26.00 © 2009 IEEE A key challenge lies in making the exchange of content uploads for credit efficient and practical, while robust to manipulation. Practice has shown that this problem is a major stumbling block for the commercial adoption of micropayment-based incentive schemes [10] . Manipulability may make content distributors wary of substantial monetary losses in case the client software is compromised.
We address this challenge based on the insight that the content provider itself is a trusted third party (TTP) and can mediate the content exchange between its clients. Under the credit-based exchange protocol, clients exchange data for credit and a server mediates the transaction. The server uses only efficient symmetric cryptography on critical data paths and sends only short messages to its clients.
In our setting, unfairness during TFT exchanges results in monetary losses for the peer that does not receive its deserved reciprocation. We address this issue using an optimistic fairexchange protocol that is an adaptation of BAR Gossip [11] and classic optimistic fair-exchange exchange schemes [12] , [13] . In optimistic fair-exchange, the trusted third party is involved only when an error occurs or when dishonest participants do not follow the protocol.
Our work makes the following contributions:
1) The design of Dandelion, a novel hybrid incentive scheme for commercial P2P content distribution, which is based on efficient cryptographic fair-exchange protocols.
2) The prototype implementation of a Dandelion-based system that is suitable for P2P distribution of static content.
3) The evaluation of our implementation on PlanetLab [14] , which identifies the scalability limits of our incentive mechanism and demonstrates the plausibility of our approach. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides background and motivates our design. Section III provides an overview of Dandelion and describes the system model under which it is designed to operate. Section IV describes the design of Dandelion and discusses its properties. Section V describes the implementation of our prototype system. Section VI presents the experimental evaluation of our implementation. In Section VII, we discuss prior work, and we conclude in Section VIII.
II. BACKGROUND
Dandelion's design addresses the incentive issues in P2P content distribution protocols such as BitTorrent [1] and eMule [15] . In this section, we motivate the design of Dandelion by discussing the weaknesses of BitTorrent's incentive mechanism.
In the rest of this paper we use a BitTorrent-like terminology. A seeder refers to a client that uploads to its peers after it has completed its download. A leecher is a client that has not completed its download. A free-rider refers to a client that downloads content from other peers without incurring any cost, i.e., without uploading content or without expending currency. A swarm refers to all clients that actively participate in the protocol for a given content item. The choking algorithm refers to the client-side function of selecting peers to upload content to (unchoke) in parallel, based on a predetermined criterion.
Optimistic unchoking refers to temporarily unchoking a peer, although that peer does not currently satisfy the unchoking criterion.
A. Impact of Seeding
The popular BitTorrent protocol employs the rate-based "titfor-tat" (TFT) incentive mechanism [1] . A peer prefers to upload to (unchoke) another peer that reciprocally uploads parts of the same file. This mechanism mitigates free-riding, but does not provide explicit incentives for seeding. Although several BitTorrent deployments rely on clients to honestly report their uploading history [16] , and use this history to decide which clients can join a swarm, practice has shown that clients can fake their upload history [10] , [17] , [18] or collude [19] .
Seeders improve download completion times, because they increase the content availability and the aggregate upload bandwidth. In addition, incentives for seeding are crucial because a large portion of P2P clients reside behind asymmetric Internet links. This means that the total upload capacity of the P2P network may be substantially lower than its total download capacity. However, lack of incentives leads to BitTorrent swarms being underprovisioned in terms of seeders [20] . In order to rectify this situation one needs to persuade peers to remain online to seed after they complete their download. In Section VI-B2, we show that the download rates of leechers in BitTorrent swarms increases substantially as the number of clients that seed increases. These observations are corroborated by previous measurements in P2P content distribution systems [20] , [21] .
B. Free-Riding in BitTorrent
A general observation is that since BitTorrent's TFT incentives reward cooperative leechers with improved download times, leechers are always incentivized to upload. This observation relies on the assumption that users aim only at maximizing their download rates. However in practice, BitTorrent users may be reluctant to upload even if uploading improves their download times. For example, users with access providers that impose quotas on outgoing traffic or users with limited uplink bandwidth (e.g., 1.5 Mbps/128 Kbps ADSL) may wish to save their uplink for other more critical tasks.
Considering the trade-off between performance and susceptibility to free-riding [22] , BitTorrent purposely does not implement a strict TFT strategy. In particular, it employs rate-based instead of chunk-level TFT, and BitTorrent clients optimistically unchoke peers for relatively long periods of time (30 s). Furthermore, BitTorrent seeders select peers to upload to regardless of whether those peers upload to others.
Based on the above observations and previous work on BitTorrent exploitation [5] , [6] , we employ the "large view" exploit [7] to free-ride in BitTorrent-like swarms. The free-rider client obtains a larger than normal view of the network and connects to all peers in its view, while it does not upload any content. Using this exploit in a sufficiently large swarm, a free-rider can find more seeders, which do not employ TFT. It can also increase the frequency with which it becomes optimistically unchoked, compared to a compliant client, which typically connects to 50-100 peers. In Section VI-C, we extend our free-riding study to further motivate our design. We experiment with free-riders in larger PlanetLab-residing torrents comprising of 400 leechers and under more realistic bandwidth distribution. We also investigate how the existence of seeders affects the effectiveness of the exploit.
Our results suggest that the large view exploit has the potential to be widely adopted because it is beneficial for free-riders. A dire prediction is that if more and more users that are reluctant to upload employ free-riding clients, BitTorrent communities will experience the "tragedy of the commons," until those users realize that they need to use cooperative clients in order to improve their download rates. Dandelion's non-manipulable incentives explicitly address this issue by preventing free-riders from obtaining any content without reciprocating or spending money.
III. OVERVIEW AND SYSTEM MODEL
We now provide an overview of Dandelion and describe the system model under which it is designed to operate. In addition, we introduce our setting and notation.
A. System Overview
The Dandelion server acts as a tracker redirecting its clients to other clients that are able to serve their requests for content. The content provider splits content into verifiable chunks, and clients exchange carefully selected chunks. The content provider deploys in addition to the server, at least one client with the complete content (initial seeder).
Dandelion employs a hybrid incentive mechanism. In case a client has content that interests a peer, but that peer does not have content that interests the client, the system entices the selfish client to upload by rewarding the client with credit. The system also rewards a selfish client with credit when the peer is unable to reciprocate at the rate it downloads from the client. The server maintains the credit balance of each of its clients and converts credit to monetary rewards, such as discounts on paid content. To ensure that no user can be dishonest in the content-for-credit transactions, we employ a fair-exchange mechanism based on symmetric key cryptography. This mechanism requires the involvement of a trusted third party in each transaction. We refer to this mechanism for exchange of content uploads for credit as credit-based exchange and the chunks that are uploaded under this mechanism as credit-traded.
A Dandelion client employs a TFT mechanism when its peers can reciprocate with content of interest. That is, the client uploads content to a peer at the same rate that the peer uploads content to the client. However, a simple TFT scheme, such as BitTorrent's, is susceptible to the "large view" exploit. Free-riders that connect to many peers in their swarm can benefit considerably by their peers' initial offers. To address this issue we employ an optimistic fair-exchange mechanism [12] , [13] based on public key cryptography. Optimistic fair-exchange requires the involvement of a trusted third party only in case a peer misbehaves. We refer to the TFT mechanism as TFT-based exchange and the chunks that are uploaded under this mechanism as TFT-traded.
B. System Model
We assume two types of clients, which we define as follows:
• Selfish (rational) clients strategize based on a utility function that describes the cost they incur when they upload a chunk to their peers and when they pay credit to download a chunk. It also describes the benefit they gain when they are rewarded with credit for correct chunks they upload. A selfish client aims at maximizing its utility. A selfish client may consider manipulating the credit system in order to increase its utility by misbehaving as follows: 1) upload no chunks to a peer, and yet claim credit; 2) upload garbage either on purpose or due to communication failure to a peer, and yet claim credit or be reciprocated with valid content by the peer; 3) download chunks from selfish clients, and yet attempt to avoid being charged or reciprocating with chunks; 4) attempt to download chunks from selfish peers that are not interested in its content without having sufficient credit; and 5) attempt to boost its credit by colluding with other clients or by opening multiple Dandelion accounts.
• Malicious clients may be faulty or strategize based on irregular utility functions, e.g., their utility may increase by harming others, despite not obtaining credit or content. They may misbehave as follows: 1) attempt to make honest clients appear as malicious or dishonest, or attempt to cause them to be charged for chunks they did not obtain; 2) attempt to perform a denial of service (DoS) attack against the server or selected clients (this attack would involve only protocol messages, as we consider bandwidth or connection flooding attacks outside the scope of this work); and 3) upload invalid chunks aiming at disrupting the distribution of content. We assume that a selfish or malicious client cannot interfere with the IP routing and forwarding function, and cannot corrupt messages, but it can eavesdrop messages. In addition, we assume that communication errors may occur during message transmissions.
C. Setting and Notation
Before we describe our design, we introduce the setting and notation.
We use to denote the description of an entity or object, e.g., denotes a client 's ID, while denotes the client itself. is a cryptographic hash function such as SHA-1, is a message authentication code such as HMAC [23] , and refers to a time period (epoch). By we denote the epoch at client or server .
denotes the MAC of the concatenation of items and , using the key .
Each user applies for a Dandelion account and is associated with a persistent ID. The server associates each client with its authentication information (client ID and password), the content item it currently downloads or seeds, its credit balance, and the content it can access. The clients and the server maintain loosely synchronized clocks using standard techniques, such as the Network Time Protocol (NTP).
Every client that wishes to join the network must establish a transport layer secure session with the server , e.g., using TLS [24] . A client sends its ID and password over the secure channel. The server generates a random secret key, denoted , which is shared with . is also sent over the secure channel. In addition, every Dandelion client obtains from the server a public/secret key pair that is issued by the content provider. 's peers obtain the public key certificate signed by the server directly from . and the public key pair are renewed upon epoch change.
The rest of the messages that are exchanged between the server and the clients are sent over an insecure channel (e.g., over plain TCP), which must originate from the same IP as the secure session. Similarly, all messages between clients are sent over an insecure channel.
Each client exchanges only short messages with the server. To prevent forgery of the message source and replay attacks, and to ensure the integrity of the message, each message includes a sequence number and a digital signature. The signature is computed as the MAC of the message and the sequence number, keyed with the secret key that shares with the server. Each time a client or the server receive a message from each other, they check whether the sequence number succeeds the sequence number of the previously received message and whether the MAC-generated signature verifies. If either of the two conditions is not satisfied, the message is discarded. The sequence number is reset when time period changes.
IV. DESIGN
In this section, we describe the design of Dandelion, which explicitly addresses the challenges posed by selfish and malicious clients, as well as the communication channel.
We introduce our credit-based exchange cryptographic protocol for the fair and non-repudiable exchange of content uploads for real monetary value. We also describe our hybrid incentive scheme, which combines the credit-based exchange with the TFT-based exchange.
A. Credit as Incentives
We aim at providing strong incentives for a selfish client to upload to a peer that does not possess content of interest or to a peer that is unable to upload as fast as the client uploads to it. To this end, we employ a cryptographic protocol to ensure the fair-exchange of content uploads for credit.
This protocol involves only efficient symmetric cryptographic operations. The server acts as the trusted third party (TTP) mediating the exchanges of content for credit among its clients, and as a credit bank maintaining records of the clients' credit balances. When a client uploads to a client , it sends encrypted content to client . To decrypt, must request the decryption key from the server. The requests for keys serve as the proof that has uploaded some content to . Thus, when the server receives a key request, it credits for uploading content to , and charges for downloading content.
When a client sends invalid content to a client , can determine its validity only after receiving the decryption key and being charged. To address this problem, our design includes a non-repudiable complaint mechanism. If intentionally sends garbage to , cannot deny that it did. In addition, is prevented from falsely claiming that has sent it garbage.
The server and the credit base are logical modules and can be distributed over a cluster (e.g., using consistent hashing based on client ID) to improve scalability and fault-tolerance.
B. Credit Management
Dandelion's incentive mechanism creates a market, which enables a variety of application scenarios. Our protocol is intended for the case in which users maintain paid accounts with the content provider. The currency employed by Dandelion is directly mapped to real monetary value that customers introduce in the market by purchasing content. We employ real instead of virtual currency to eliminate depletion, inflation and starvation issues that plague typical virtual currency systems [25] .
Selfish clients may sell upload service to peers that are unable to reciprocate with equally fast uploads. The content provider rewards uploaders with a credit value for the uploading of a chunk, which is fixed for every chunk and every client. Downloaders spend credit units for each chunk they download. A client is awarded sufficient initial credit to download the complete paid content from its peers, without having to upload. In this way, slow uploaders do not face starvation and they are able to expend their credit at the rate needed to achieve their desired download rate.
The content provider redeems a client's accumulated credit for monetary rewards, such as discounts on content prices or service membership fees. We assume that the content provider prices chunk uploads appropriately to ensure that for the vast majority of clients, utility increases when they utilize their uplink in exchange for credit. We set , so that two colluding clients cannot increase the sum of their credit by falsely claiming that they upload to each other. A client can acquire a chunk from a peer that is not interested in the client's content only if the client's credit is greater than . A user cannot boost its credit by presenting multiple IDs (the Sybil attack [26] ) and claiming to have uploaded to some of its registered IDs. This is because each user maintains an authenticated paid account with the provider. The user essentially purchases its initial credit, and the net sum in an upload-download transaction between any two IDs is zero.
C. Client Access Control
Before we present Dandelion's fair-exchange mechanisms, we describe how Dandelion enables the server and its clients to determine which clients are authorized participants. We also describe how clients obtain information about the content and the swarm. Fig. 1 provides a high-level description of the client access control protocol and we describe it in detail below.
Step 1: The protocol starts with the client sending a request for the content item to the server
Step 2: If has access to , the server chooses a short list of peers , among the ones that are currently in the swarm for . The policy with which these peers are selected depends on the specifics of the content distribution system. Each list entry contains the ID of the peer and the peer's inbound Internet address. For every peer in , sends a ticket to , where is the current timestamp. The ticket is only valid for a certain time length and allows to request chunks of the content from client . When expires and still wishes to download from , requests a new from . The ticket enables to filter out service requests from misbehaving or unauthorized peers. To ensure integrity in the case of static content or video on demand, also sends to the SHA-1 hash for all chunks of
Step 3: Upon receiving the server's response, connects to each client to request the content . In the rest of this description, we list only the steps that involve , and a specific client
Step 4: If and is not in 's cache, verifies whether . If the verification fails, drops this request. Also, if is greater than 's current time period , learns that it should renew its key with . Otherwise, caches and periodically sends the chunk announcement message described below, for the period that the timestamp is fresh. This message contains a list of chunks that owns,
. also does so in separate chunk announcement messages. The specifics of which chunks are announced and how frequently depend on the type of content distribution
D. Exchanging Content Uploads for Credit
We now describe in detail Dandelion's cryptographic creditbased exchange protocol (Fig. 1) .
Step 5: and determine which chunks to download from each other according to a chunk selection policy. For example, BitTorrent's locally-rarest-first [1] is suitable for static content distribution. sends a request for the missing chunk to
Step 6: 's chunk requests are served by as long as the timestamp is fresh, and is cached or verifies. encrypts using a symmetric encryption algorithm , as .
is a key and encryption initialization vector pair generated as ( , ).
Next, hashes the ciphertext as . Subsequently, it computes its commitment to the encrypted chunk as . The commitment is only valid for a certain time length , which forces to purchase the chunk at the server before expires. This fact allows to promptly acquire credit for its service
Step 7: Since does not know the key that was used to generate in step 6, it needs to request from the server. As soon as receives the encrypted chunk, computes its own hash over the received ciphertext and sends a decryption key request message to
Step 8: If
, and the reported epoch of is off by at most one, checks if . The commitment's verification may fail either because due to transmission error in step 6 or because or are misbehaving. Since is unable to determine which is the case, it punishes neither or and does not update their credit. does not send the decryption key to but it notifies of the discrepancy. In case repeatedly sends invalid chunk response messages, is expected to disconnect from and blacklist it. If keeps sending invalid decryption key requests that involve , penalizes . If the verification succeeds, checks whether has sufficient credit to purchase the chunk . It also checks again whether has access to the content . If is approved, charges and rewards with credit units. Subsequently, computes as ( , ) and sends it to uses to decrypt the chunk as . Next, we explain the complaint mechanism.
Step 9: If the decryption fails or if (step 2, Section IV-C), complains to by sending the following message ignores this message if , where .
should be greater than the time needed for to request and receive a decryption key response, decrypt the chunk and send a complaint to the server. With this condition, a misbehaving client cannot avoid unfavorable complaint resolution by ensuring that the time elapsed between the moment commits to the encrypted chunk and the moment the encrypted chunk is received by is slightly less than . also ignores the complaint message if a complaint for the same and is in a cache of recent complaints that maintains for each client . Complaints are evicted from this cache once . If , punishes . This is because has already notified that is invalid in step 8. If verifies, caches this complaint, re-computes once again, retrieves from its storage, and encrypts himself using , . If the hash of the ciphertext is equal to the value that sent to , decides that has acted correctly and 's complaint is unjustified. Subsequently, drops the complaint request and blacklists . It also notifies , which disconnects from and blacklists it. Otherwise, if , decides that was cheated by , blacklists , revokes the corresponding credit charge on and notifies that its complaint has been resolved. Similarly, disconnects from and locally blacklists it. The server disconnects from a blacklisted client , marks it as blacklisted in the credit file and denies access to if it attempts to login. Future complaints that concern and are non-duplicate, non-expired and with valid commitments, are ruled against without further processing.
E. Rate-Based TFT With Optimistic Fair-Exchange
Here we describe how Dandelion combines the credit-based exchange and the TFT-based exchange into one hybrid incentive scheme. With the credit-based exchange, clients that cannot upload at the rate their peers upload to them, pay the excess offered bandwidth in credit. However, when two clients are mutually interested in each other's content and are able to upload to each other at the same rate, they may use TFT incentives, i.e., employ the TFT-based exchange. The TFT-based exchange mechanism aims at reducing the decryption key request load on the server. It enables a pair of clients to barter their uplink resources without requiring the server to mediate their transactions.
The trade surplus of a client with respect to a peer is the the difference between the number of TFT-traded chunks the client has uploaded to the peer and the number of TFT-traded chunks the client has downloaded from the peer. The trade surplus threshold is the maximum value that the trade surplus can take before the client with the positive trade surplus switches to credit-based exchange.
If a client is a seeder, it always uploads using the credit-based exchange. Otherwise, if the client's trade surplus with a peer is less than or equal to the specified threshold, each client responds to requests for chunks from its peers with TFT-traded chunks. If the surplus exceeds , the client responds with credit-traded chunks.
A strawman approach for TFT-based exchange would involve employing a TFT scheme under which clients exchange plaintext chunks, as long as the trade surplus does not exceed a threshold [5] . However, this scheme cannot guarantee absolute fairness, as the last peer that receives content may refrain from reciprocating. If in addition a free-rider employs the "large view exploit" or the trade surplus threshold is high, a free-rider can download a substantial amount of content without incurring any cost (see Section VI-C). The free-rider problem is exacerbated under Dandelion, as the gains of free-riders translate to monetary losses for their peers.
To address this problem, we employ an optimistic fair-exchange scheme, which allows clients to barter their uplink bandwidth in a fair manner. This scheme involves the server only in case of client misbehavior. It is adapted from BAR Gossip [11] and classic optimistic fair-exchange protocols [12] , [13] . Next, we provide a high-level description of the cryptographic TFT-based exchange protocol. Due to space limitations and its similarity to previously proposed schemes we omit a detailed description and refer interested readers to [27] .
When a client uploads a TFT-traded chunk to a client , is encrypted using symmetric key cryptography. To decrypt, must reciprocate with at least one TFT-traded chunk to . After receiving , sends the decryption key for to . In turn, reciprocates with the decryption key for . sends TFT-traded chunks to as long as the trade surplus does not exceed the threshold.
Every client maintains the decryption key surplus for each of its peers .
is the difference between the number of decryption keys for TFT-traded chunks the client sent to and the number of decryption keys the client received from . A client sends to a decryption key for a sent TFT-traded chunk if both of the following two conditions are satisfied: a) ; and b) it has received TFT-traded chunks from for which it has not received decryption keys or . If sends an invalid chunk to , can detect it only after sending the decryption key for the valid chunk to . To address this issue, we include a non-repudiable complaint mechanism similar to the one used by the credit-based exchange. Unlike the credit-based exchange however, in the TFT-based exchange, senders commit to chunks and decryption keys they send using public key signatures. This is because the server is involved only in case of client misbehavior. Therefore, clients should be able to determine the validity of the commitments to the transmitted chunks without querying the server as in step 7 (Section IV-D).
A Dandelion client must be able to switch between the creditand TFT-based exchange depending on content availability and peer upload and download rates. Therefore, we need an algorithm that aims at reducing the amount of credit-based uploads to each peer, while it ensures that the client uploads to its peers at the maximum rate its peers can download from it.
Rather than employing a complex per-peer resource allocation algorithm, we use the following simple scheme. At any moment, a client selects a specified number of peers to which to upload using a downloader selection algorithm almost identical to BitTorrent's. The only difference with BitTorrent is that a Dandelion leecher ranks its peers based only on the rate with which they upload TFT-traded chunks to the leecher.
When a leecher selects the fastest TFT-traded chunk uploaders, it selects peers that are more likely to match its own TFT-based uploads. This results in invoking the credit-based exchange less frequently.
F. Design Properties
We now list the properties of our design. For brevity of presentation, we omit proofs on why these properties hold. They can be found in [27] .
Lemma 1: A selfish or a malicious client cannot assume another authorized client 's identity and issue messages under . Thus, it cannot obtain service at the expense of or cause to be charged for service it did not obtain or cause to be blacklisted. In addition, it cannot issue a valid for an invalid chunk that it sends to a client and cause to produce a complaint message that would result in a verdict against .
Lemma 2: If the server charges a client credit units for a chunk received from a selfish client , must have received the correct , regardless of the actions taken by .
Lemma 3: If a selfish client always encrypts chunk anew when serving a request, as described in step 6 (Section IV-D), and if sends a valid to , then is awarded credit units from , and is charged credit units from . Lemma 4: A malicious client cannot replay previously sent valid requests to the server or generate decryption key requests or complaints under another client 's ID. Thus, it cannot cause to be charged for service it did not obtain or cause to be blacklisted because of invalid or duplicate complaints.
Lemma 5: Under the TFT-based exchange scheme, a selfish client cannot obtain a chunk from its peer without expending bandwidth to reciprocate with a valid chunk itself. In addition, as stated in [11] , a rational prefers to send the short decryption key for an already sent valid chunk , rather than repeatedly receive requests for the key from .
Observation 1: To maintain an efficient content distribution pipeline, a client needs to relay a chunk to its peers as soon as it receives it. However, the chunk may be invalid due to communication error or due to client misbehavior. The performance of the system would be severely degraded if clients wasted bandwidth to relay invalid content. To address this issue, Dandelion clients send a decryption key request to the server immediately upon receiving the encrypted chunk. This design choice enables clients to promptly retrieve the chunk in its non-encrypted form and verify its integrity prior to uploading the chunk to their peers.
Observation 2: If a client does not have sufficient credit, it cannot download chunks from a selfish peer that is not interested in the client's content. Our design choice to involve the server in each exchange of content uploads for credit enables the server to check a client's credit balance, before the client retrieves the decryption key of a chunk.
Observation 3: A malicious client can abandon the creditbased exchange protocol after receiving the encrypted chunk without completing the transaction. In such case, does not receive any credit, even though has consumed 's resources. This is a denial of service (DoS) attack against . Note that this attack would require client to expend resources proportional to the resources of the victim , therefore it is not particularly practical. Furthermore, we prevent clients that have been designated as misbehavers (blacklisted) in step 9 or clients that do not maintain paid accounts with the content provider from launching such attacks; the server issues short-lived tickets (step 2, Section IV-C) only to authorized and non-blacklisted clients.
Observation 4: A malicious client may send a credit-traded chunk with an invalid MAC signature aiming at performing a DoS attack against , without becoming blacklisted by the server. This attack would require client to expend resources proportional to the resources of the victim , therefore it is not particularly practical. In addition, a victim can be attacked by only one chunk before it locally blacklists the attacker. Furthermore as before, we prevent unauthorized clients or ones that have been blacklisted by the server from launching such attack.
Observation 5: A malicious client cannot DoS attack the server by sending invalid content to other clients or repeatedly sending invalid complaints aiming at causing the server to perform complaint resolution. That client must be a user registered with the system, otherwise it is not able to mint a complaint that merits resolution. Even if the client is a registered user, it becomes blacklisted by both the server and its peers the moment an invalid complaint is ruled against it. In addition, a malicious client cannot attack the server by sending valid signed messages with duplicate valid complaints. Our protocol detects duplicate complaints through the use of timestamps and caching of recent complaints.
Owing to Lemmas 1, 2, 3, and 5 as well as Observation 2, and given that the content provider appropriately valuates chunk uploads, Dandelion ensures that most selfish clients increase their utility when they upload correct chunks. At the same time, misbehaving clients cannot increase their utility. Consequently, Dandelion provides strong incentives for most selfish clients to upload to their peers.
G. Discussion
We now discuss our scheme's economic viability and potential for adoption. We argue that a content provider obtains more gains using our approach than by using a protocol such as BitTorrent that does not provide robust incentives for seeding.
When seeding is not strongly incentivized, a content provider needs to purchase additional hardware and bandwidth to directly provide a large portion of the required upload capacity. On the other hand, Dandelion enables the content provider to make a less expensive investment towards rewarding cooperative peers with real money. As a result, peers are strongly incentivized and the total upload capacity of the swarm increases.
Next, we support our insight that it is cheaper for content providers to purchase bandwidth from their users than purchase the infrastructure to directly serve content or purchase the service of third party CDNs. We make the conservative assumption that half of the price paid by broadband customers goes towards purchasing the uplink bandwith. Based on current DSL, cable and, FiOS offers in the U.S., we extrapolate that user uplink bandwidth costs between $2 and $5 per Mbps per month [28] , [29] . On the other hand, depending on location, it costs at least $40 to $80 per Mbps for a content provider to purchase T-3 to OC-12 bandwidth, with the cost of an OC-12 installation being on the order of $500 000 [30] .
Therefore, although with Dandelion the content provider expends money to purchase its clients' bandwidth, he might incur lower cost compared to purchasing server bandwidth from Internet service providers. Although a user's uplink bandwidth may cost more than the content provider is willing to pay, that bandwidth is typically unused or altruistically assigned to other P2P applications. Therefore, we hypothesize that our scheme can enable users to benefit from their spare bandwidth and content providers to tap into that relatively low cost resource. Validating this hypothesis requires a real market experiment, which is beyond the scope of this work.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
This section describes a prototype C implementation of the Dandelion system, which is suitable for static content distribution.
A. Server Implementation
For simplicity, our current implementation combines the content provider and the credit management system at a single server. It is our future work to scale the Dandelion server by balancing its load over multiple machines.
Our current server implementation is single-threaded and event-driven. The network I/O operations are asynchronous, and data are transmitted over TCP. In order to scale to thousands of simultaneously connected clients, the server employs the epoll event dispatching mechanism.
The server uses standard file I/O system calls to efficiently manage persistent client information, which is stored in a simple file called the credit file. Each client is assigned an entry in the credit file, which keeps the client's credit, its authentication information and its file access control information. Each entry has the same size and the client ID determines the offset of the entry of each client in the file. Thus each entry can be efficiently accessed for both queries and updates.
The server queries and updates a client's credit from and to the credit file upon every transaction. Yet, it does not force commitment of the update to persistent storage. Instead, it relies on the OS to asynchronously perform the commitment.
B. Client Implementation
The client side is also single-threaded and event-driven. A client may leech or seed multiple files at a time. A client can be decomposed into two logical modules: 1) the connection management module; and 2) the peer-serving module.
The connection management module performs peering and uploader discovery. With peering, each client obtains a random partial swarm view from the server and strives to connect to a specified number of peers (typically 50-100). With uploader discovery, a client strives to remain connected to a minimum number of uploading peers.
The peer-serving module performs content reconciliation and downloader selection. Content reconciliation refers to the function of announcing recently received chunks, requesting missing chunks, requesting decryption keys for received encrypted chunks, and replying to chunk requests. Our implementation employs rarest-random-first [31] scheduling in requesting missing chunks from clients. To efficiently utilize their downlink bandwidth, clients dynamically adjust the number of outstanding chunk requests that a client has sent to Fig. 2 . Aggregate server decryption key response throughput as a function of specified per-client key request rate. We use 1000 clients and we vary the server rate-limits. a peer and has not received a response for. We described the downloader selection algorithm in Section IV-E.
VI. EVALUATION
The goals of this experimental evaluation are: 1) to identify the scalability limits of Dandelion's centralized non-manipulable virtual-currency; 2) to examine the trade-off between performance and scalability in selecting the parameters of Dandelion's hybrid incentive scheme; 3) to motivate our design by demonstrating the importance of incentives for seeding and the impact of free-riding in BitTorrent-like swarms.
A. Server Performance
In this section, we evaluate and profile the server in terms of decryption key and complaint request throughput.
1) Server Throughput:
A Dandelion server mediates the chunk exchanges between its clients. The client plaintext download throughput and the scalability of our system is bound by how fast a server can process their decryption key requests (step 8, Section IV-D). Both the server's computational resources and bandwidth may become the performance bottleneck. We deploy a Dandelion server on a dual Pentium D 2.8 GHz/1 MB CPU with 1 GB RAM and 250 GB/7200 RPM HDD running Linux 2.6.5-1.358 smp, which shares a 100-Mbps Ethernet II link. To mitigate bandwidth variability in the shared link and to emulate a low cost server with uplinks and downlinks that range from 1 to 5 Mbps, we rate-limit our Dandelion server at the application layer. We deploy 1000 clients that run on 100 distinct PlanetLab hosts.
The clients send requests for decryption keys to the server and we measure the aggregate rate with which all clients receive decryption key responses. The server always queries and updates the credit record from and to the credit file without forcing commitment to disk. We run each experiment for a specified per-client request rate, which varies from 1 to 6 req/s. For each request rate, the experiment duration is 10 min and the results are averaged over 10 runs. Fig. 2 depicts the server's decryption key response throughput for varying server bandwidth. As the bandwidth increases from 1 to 4 Mbps, so does the server's throughput, indicating that for up to 4 Mbps access link, the bottleneck is the bandwidth. For 5 and 4 Mbps, the throughput is almost equal, indicating that for 5 Mbps the bottleneck is the CPU. The results show that a server running on our commodity PC with 4 or 5 Mbps access link can process up to 3105 decryption key requests per second. This result suggests that with a 256-kB chunk size, this server may simultaneously support almost 3100 clients that download only credit-traded chunks at 256 kB/s. With a larger chunk size and TFT-based exchange, each such client receives credit-traded chunks at a lower rate. Thus, the number of supported clients increases.
We also compare the throughput of the 5 Mbps server in case 500 clients send 10 req/s each (3114 req/s, not depicted in Fig. 2 ) with its throughput when 1000 clients send 5 req/s each (3105 req/s). This result suggests that the throughput is mostly independent of the number of clients due to the scalability of the epoll event dispatching mechanism.
A Dandelion server is also responsible for resolving complaints (step 9, Section IV-D). A complaint resolution involves the expensive disk I/O operation for reading a chunk. Therefore it represents a performance bottleneck in case the system receives too many complaints. We performed an experiment with 1000 clients sending 5 decryption key req/s, and 15 clients sending 1 complaint resolution request per second (involving a randomly selected 256-kB chunk of a 1-GB file). The 5 Mbps server was able to deliver roughly 1490 decryption key responses per second along with 14 complaint resolution responses per second.
Note that the server does not need to deliver high complaint resolution throughput for the reasons listed in Observation 5, Section IV-F. In addition, to improve throughput, the expensive disk I/O operation can be performed in parallel with the decryption key request processing using asynchronous I/O.
2) Server Profiling: We profile the cost of operations at the server aiming at identifying the performance bottlenecks of our design. We use the same machine as the one used in the previous section. Table I lists the cost of Dandelion operations. Timings for operations 1-4 and 6-8 are obtained using getrusage() over 10 000 executions. Timings for operations 5, 12, and 13 are approximated using gettimeofday() over 10 000 executions. Operation 5 reads from the disk a new randomly selected 256-kB chunk of a 1-GB file in each execution. Operations 12-13 are performed on a credit file with 10 000 44-byte entries. Timings for operations 9-11 are approximated according to our application layer rate-limiting for 5 Mbps uplink and downlink. They are provided as reference for comparison with CPU-centric and credit management operations. Operation 6 uses 8-byte-block Blowfish-CBC with 128-bit key and 128-bit initialization vector. Operations 1-4 use HMAC-SHA1 with 128-bit key. Operation 7 uses SHA-1. Operation 8 uses 1024-bit RSA signatures.
The main tasks of a Dandelion server are to: 1) receive the decryption key request (operation 9); 2) authenticate the decryption key request (operation 1); 3) verify the commitment (operation 2); 4) compute the decryption key (operation 3); 5) query and update the credit of the two clients involved (operations 12 and 13); 6) sign the decryption key response (operation 4); and 7) send the decryption key response (operation 10). The signed decryption key request and decryption key responses are sent over an insecure TCP connection. A client establishes and uses the secure TLS channel with the server only to send authentication information (once per Dandelion session), the shared key and the public key pair (the same keys are used for a relatively long period).
As can be seen in Table I , the per-decryption-key-request cryptographic operations of the server (operations 1-4) are highly efficient (total s), as only symmetric cryptography is employed. The credit management operations (12 and 13) are also efficient (total s). The communication costs of receiving and sending decryption key responses (operations 9-10) are clearly higher than the cryptographic computation costs. In addition, operations 9-10 can take place concurrently with each other and the computational operations.
The cost of a complaint is substantially higher because in addition to receiving the message (operations 9 or 11), authenticating it and verifying a commitment (operations 2 or 8), it involves reading a chunk (operation 5), encrypting it with the sender's key (operation 6), and hashing the encrypted chunk (operation 7).
B. System Performance
In this section, we experimentally evaluate the behavior of the entire Dandelion system on PlanetLab. We examine the impact of chunk size and the trade surplus threshold on the performance of the system, We also quantify the scalability gains obtained through Dandelion's new hybrid scheme. In addition, we demonstrate the performance gains of providing incentives for seeding. In all experiments we run a Dandelion server on the same machine as the one used in the previous sections, and the server is rate-limited at 5 Mbps.
Leechers are given sufficient initial credit to completely download a file, according to the credit management policy discussed in Section IV-B. Clients always respond to chunk requests from their selected downloaders.
We aim at making our evaluation representative of real Internet peer-to-peer content distribution swarms, while including This distribution draws from the one reported in [32] , but due to PlanetLab bandwidth constraints, we omit hosts with upload capacity higher than 350 kB/s. as many PlanetLab nodes as possible. To this end, we partially emulate a typical client uplink bandwidth distribution [32] ( Table II) by applying per-client application layer rate-limiting. We periodically use Dandelion to distribute a 100-MB file to 500 non-rate-limited hosts and we identify 400 nodes that are able to attain upload rates equal to or higher than 350 kB/s. The 350 kB/s upload cap is plausible because we expect Dandelion clients to reside behind privately own residential broadband links. These links are reported to currently offer at most 3 Mbps upload capacity [33] . In addition, we impose a download rate distribution to approximate the effect of asymmetric broadband links. Clients with less than or equal to 70 kB/s upload rate, are assigned a maximum download rate that is 5 times higher than their maximum upload rate. The rest of the nodes are assigned a download rate equal to 350 kB/s.
For each configuration we repeat the experiment 10 times and we extract mean values and 95% confidence intervals over the swarm-wide download completion times.
We note that we evaluate a particular implementation of Dandelion that is suitable for static content distribution. Although our results would vary for other P2P content distribution applications that use different chunk scheduling and peer selection policies, we expect our results to be qualitatively similar. In particular we expect seeding to be beneficial and the chunk size and trade surplus threshold to affect performance, regardless of the specifics of the content distribution system.
1) Selecting Chunk Size and Trade Surplus Threshold:
With this series of experiments we examine the trade-offs involved in selecting the size of the chunk and the trade surplus threshold of the TFT-based exchange. In addition, we motivate our hybrid incentive mechanism by quantifying its improvement in scalability over the credit-based-exchangeonly scheme proposed in [9] . Intuitively, since clients are able to serve a chunk only as soon as they obtain it, a smaller chunk size yields a more efficient distribution pipeline. In addition, when the file is divided into many pieces, chunk scheduling techniques such as rarest-first can be more effective; clients can promptly discover and download content of interest. However, a smaller chunk size increases the rate with which key requests are sent to the server, reducing the scalability of the system. Also, due to TCP's slow start, a small chunk size cannot ensure high bandwidth utilization during the TCP transfer of any chunk. Last, small chunks yield increased control overhead.
In addition, under our optimistic fair exchange scheme, a receiver is able to acquire a TFT-traded chunk only after it reciprocates with a chunk of equal size and retrieves the decryption key. The larger a received TFT-traded chunk is, the longer the receiver may have to wait until it is able to respond with an equally large chunk. Only after decrypting the chunk the receiver is able to relay it to its peers, therefore a large chunk decreases the efficiency of the distribution pipeline.
As the trade surplus threshold and the chunk size increases, trading flexibility also increases. This enables a client to upload TFT-traded chunks in case its peers cannot temporarily match the client's upload rate. This results in reduction of the rate with which decryption key requests are sent to the server. However, a large threshold and chunk size results in clients wasting bandwidth to transmit encrypted chunks that are never reciprocated and decrypted, causing performance degradation.
We use as performance metrics the mean download completion time of the clients and the decryption key request load on the server. In each configuration, we deploy approximately 400 Dandelion leechers and one initial seeder. Leechers start downloading the file almost simultaneously emulating a flashcrowd. The duration of each experiment is 2200 s. Fig. 3 shows the leecher mean download completion time as a function of the chunk size and the trade surplus threshold. We observe that for larger than 256-kB chunks, the system's performance degrades as the chunk size and the trade surplus threshold increases. For example, for , a 256-kB chunk size yields better performance (864 s) than a 2048-kB chunk size (1263 s). 256-kB chunks guarantee that there are sufficiently many distinct chunks for peers to exchange. The beneficial impact of smaller than 256-kB chunks in terms of chunk scheduling flexibility is negated by the performance-degrading TCP effects and the increased control overhead. For example, for , a 256-kB chunk size yields notably better performance (864 s) than a 32-kB chunk size (1031 s). In addition, we observe that the mean download completion times consistently increases with .
In Fig. 4 , we observe that the load on the server decreases as increases. In particular, under our network configuration the decryption key request load decreases by approximately 40% when the system uses instead of . At the same time, the swarm-wide performance degrades only by 9 to 13%, depending on chunk size. Setting corresponds to using only credit-based exchange as was originally proposed in [9] , while allows clients that are mutually interested in each other's content to exchange chunks without involving the server. This result demonstrates the effectiveness of our hybrid incentive scheme in improving scalability by reducing the server's decryption key request load.
As expected, the server load also decreases as the chunk size increases. The decryption key request load for 32-kB chunks varies in 600 to 1200 req/s depending on . For 256-kB chunks it varies in only 70 to 190 req/s. The evaluation for 32-kB chunks enables us to roughly predict the load on the server in a swarm that consists of 8 times more clients but uses 256-kB chunks For this particular swarm configuration, the content provider may determine that a 256-kB chunk and is a good configuration. It yields a low download completion time (893 s) and a relatively low server load (132 req/s). Unless mentioned otherwise, in the rest of this evaluation we use these values.
2) Impact of Seeders: Dandelion's credit-based exchange mechanism strongly incentivizes clients to remain online after download completion, increasing the number of seeders in a swarm. With this series of experiments, we motivate our creditbased exchange mechanism by demonstrating the performance gains by the existence of additional seeders.
Intuitively, since typical P2P clients reside behind asymmetric links, content distribution swarms are expected to benefit by the existence of additional seeders. Seeders complement the swarm's uplink bandwidth without expending its downlink bandwidth. We demonstrate the impact of seeders in BitTorrent-like swarms by varying the probability that a leecher remains online to seed a file after it completes its download. Upon completion of its download, each leecher stays in the swarm and seeds with probability , which varies in 0% to 100%. Leechers start downloading the file immediately upon arriving in the swarm. The duration of each experiment is 2200 s. Fig. 5 depicts the mean download completion time over 400 leechers as a function of the file size, for varying . All clients join the swarm almost simultaneously. We vary the file size to demonstrate that the impact of seeding depends on the duration of the download, and to demonstrate the behavior of the system under different workloads. Our results show the beneficial impact of seeders. For example, for a 100-MB file, we observe a swarm-wide mean download completion time of 893 and 1250 s when and , respectively. We observe that as the file size decreases, the decrease of causes a more dramatic increase of download completion times. The larger the file is, the longer leechers remain online to download it, thus they upload to their peers for longer periods. For smaller files however, peers have to rely heavily on leechers that become seeders. We also evaluate the system under varying peer arrival patterns. We vary the Poisson parameter under which new clients join the swarm. Depending on the arrival pattern, seeders may play a more or a less beneficial role. For example, during a flash crowd (high ) many peers finish their download at approximately the same time and therefore do not benefit each other when they remain online as seeders. Fig. 6 depicts the mean download completion time over all 400 leechers as a function of the client Poisson arrival rate , for varying and a 100-MB file. The results show that seeders substantially benefit swarms with low arrival rates, as new peers take advantage of the additional uplink capacity of peers that arrived earlier and became seeders. For example, for , we observe a swarm-wide mean download completion time of 689 and 1125 s when and , respectively. 3) Comparison With BitTorrent: Unlike BitTorrent, Dandelion's incentive mechanism requires the involvement of a centralized component, uses optimistic fair-exchange of content uploads, employs a modified downloader selection algorithm and does not employ subpiecing [1] . In this section, we show that these differences do not have a negative impact on download completion time.
To this end, we compare the performance of a swarm of Dandelion clients with a swarm of BitTorrent (CTorrent DNH-3.2) clients. In both swarms, there are 400 leechers and one initial seeder, and leechers stay online to seed after download completion. Dandelion clients employ both the credit-based and TFTbased exchange protocols. Fig. 7 presents the CDF of the download completion times for both BitTorrent and Dandelion clients for a 100-MB file. This illustration shows that a Dandelion swarm can attain performance comparable to a BitTorrent one, when both swarms have the same number of seeders. Although our Dandelion implementation appears to outperform BitTorrent, we do not claim that a Dandelion-based static content distribution system is better-performing. The performance of both protocols is highly dependent on numerous parameters, which we have not exhaustively analyzed.
C. Free-Riding in BitTorrent-Like Swarms
In this section, we provide additional motivation for the use of non-manipulable cryptographic fair-exchange incentives. We demonstrate that under BitTorrent-like incentives, free-riding is beneficial for free-riders and harmful for cooperative clients.
For all experiments we use a Dandelion implementation in which we disable the cryptographic fair-exchange protocols. Unless mentioned otherwise, we also disable the trade surplus mechanism. With disabled fair-exchange protocols, Dandelion's implementation is almost identical to BitTorrent's. We use this implementation because it includes a trade-surplus mechanism and we have also validated it against BitTorrent (Section VI-B3). We deploy 400 leechers and one initial seeder. All clients join the swarm simultaneously to download a 100-MB file divided in 256-kB chunks. The duration of each experiment is 2200 s. Free-riders never upload, nor do they expend credit.
In each experiment, the swarm includes a group of 20 freeriders and a group of 20 cooperative clients all of which have upload and download rate-limits equal to 100 and 350 kB/s, respectively. In the rest of this evaluation we call the groups of the 20 free-rider and 20 cooperative clients, the free-rider and the reference cooperative group, respectively. The rest of the leechers are rate-limited according to the distribution used in Section VI-B. Unless mentioned otherwise, cooperative and free-rider clients connect to roughly 50 and 350 peers at a time, respectively.
For each configuration we repeat the experiment 10 times and we extract mean values and 95% confidence intervals of client download rates. If the client completes its download during the experiment, its download rate is equal to the size of downloaded content divided by the download completion time. Otherwise, its download rate is the size of downloaded content divided by the experiment duration. Fig. 8(a) compares the two groups when the portion of leechers that remain online to seed varies from 0% to 100%. With this measurement we show that the "large view" exploit (Section II-B) enables free-riders to tap into scarce system resources and harm compliant clients by monopolizing the seeders and exploiting optimistic unchoking. For comparison purposes, for each percentage of leechers that become seeders we also depict the download rate of the cooperative group in the absence of free-riders.
We observe that free-riders obtain almost equal download rates with their cooperative counterparts in under-provisioned swarms with 0% to 25% seeders. Compliant clients suffer a performance hit of approximately 15%, comparing to their performance in the absence of free-riders. When the swarm has 50% to 100% leechers that become seeders, free-rider clients achieve 5% to 10% higher download rates than cooperative ones. This result confirms the potential for wide adoption of free-riding. In well-provisioned swarms, the download rate of cooperative clients degrades by roughly 10% comparing to their rate in the absence of free-riders.
In Fig. 8(b) , we compare the average performance of the free-rider and the 20-client reference cooperative group as the number of free-riders ranges from 0 to 100 clients. All leechers become seeders upon download completion. This measurement shows that the wide adoption of free-rider clients causes substantial performance degradation in BitTorrent swarms. When the number of free-riders varies in 50 to 100, the reference cooperative group attains approximately 20% to 30% worse performance than in a swarm with no free-riders. We also observe that as the number of free-riders increases, free-riders do not fare as well comparing to compliant clients. Fig. 8(c) depicts the performance of the free-rider group when free-riders do not download from seeders and cooperative clients employ a chunk-level TFT scheme using the trade surplus mechanism. Under this scheme, leechers upload plaintext chunks to their selected downloaders as long as the trade surplus does not exceed 1. BitTorrent does not currently prevent free-riders from downloading from seeders. On the other hand, Dandelion seeders are motivated to upload only encrypted content, for which they are rewarded. No leechers become seeders. The number of peers to which free-riders connect to varies in 50 to 350 to illustrate the impact of the "large view" exploit.
As can be seen in Fig. 8(c) , when free-riders connect to 350 peers, they can attain up to 33 kB/s. Although this is not a good download rate by itself, recall that any gains of a Dandelion free-rider translate to monetary losses for its peers. With this Fig. 8 . Swarm-wide mean download rates of a group of 20 free-riders and a group of 20 cooperative clients that join a swarm of 350 leechers to download a 100-MB file. (a) Download rates for varying percentage of peers that remain online seeding after download completion. We also depict the download rate of cooperative clients in the absence of free-riders ("No free-riders"); (b) Download rates for varying number of free-riders; (c) Download rates of free-riders when they cannot download from seeders, for varying number of peers that they connect to. measurement, we show that the credit-based exchange substantially reduces the free-rider download rates. We also motivate Dandelion's TFT-based exchange. That is, we show that even if we employ credit-based exchange and enforce strict chunk-level TFT, free-riders that employ the "large view" exploit are able to download non-negligible amounts of content without expending credit or uplink bandwidth.
VII. RELATED WORK
We discuss previous work on incentives for cooperation in peer-to-peer content distribution systems. Due to space limitations we provide an abbreviated discussion on existing incentive schemes and we omit previous work on cryptographic fair-exchange. For more detailed exposition, we refer the reader to [27] .
In P2P content distribution protocols that employ pairwise virtual currency as incentives, e.g., [15] , [34] - [36] , clients maintain credit balances with each of their peers. In this context, credit refers to any metric of a peer's cooperativeness. These pairwise credit-based incentive mechanisms bear weaknesses that are similar to the ones of rate-based TFT: 1) they provide no explicit incentives for seeding; and 2) they can be manipulated by free-riders that obtain a "large view" of the network.
BAR Gossip [11] is designed for P2P streaming of live content. Owing to its public-key-based cryptographic fair-exchange mechanism, it is robust to clients that attempt to free-ride. However, to ensure fairness, BAR Gossip clients that receive initial optimistic offers (termed Optimistic Push) from their peers need to expend bandwidth in order to reciprocate with invalid or no longer relevant chunk transmissions. In addition, a BAR Gossip client can download only as fast as it can upload. In contrast, if Dandelion clients are not able to reciprocate, the system switches to credit-based exchange and clients may purchase the excess bandwidth. Dandelion, which needs to incentivize seeding, guarantees fair-exchange of content uploads for credit. On the other hand, since in P2P live streaming peers are concurrently interested in the same content, BAR Gossip only provides TFT incentives.
Karma [37] employs a global credit bank and fair-exchange of content for reception proofs. It distributes credit management among multiple nodes. Karma's distributed credit management improves scalability. However, it does not guarantee the integrity of the global currency in a highly dynamic network or when the majority of the nodes comprising the credit bank are malicious. In contrast, Dandelion's centrally maintained global currency is non-manipulable by clients, enabling a content provider to incentivize client cooperation by offering monetary rewards.
PPay [38] and more recently PACE [39] are micropayment proposals that employ public key cryptography and are designed for P2P content distribution. MNet [10] uses a combination of pairwise balances and tokens that can be cashed in a central broker. These schemes do not guarantee fair-exchange of content for payment. Free-riders may establish short-lived sessions to many peers, and download substantial amounts of content or obtain payments without paying or uploading, respectively. In addition, free-riders may send payments that do not reflect real credit value (double-spending).
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper describes Dandelion, an incentive scheme for cooperative (P2P) distribution of paid content. Its primary function is to enable a content provider to motivate its clients to contribute their uplink bandwidth.
Our scheme rewards cooperative clients with credit or with reciprocal uploads from their peers. Since it employs non-manipulable cryptographic schemes for the fair exchange of resources, the content provider can redeem a client's credit for monetary rewards. Thus, our design provides strong incentives for clients to seed content and eliminates free-riding.
Our experimental results show that a Dandelion server running on commodity hardware and with moderate bandwidth can scale to a few thousand clients. Dandelion's deployment in medium size swarms demonstrates that seeding substantially improves swarm-wide performance and that a Dandelion-based content distribution system can attain performance comparable to BitTorrent. It also demonstrates that the proposed hybrid incentive scheme significantly reduces the load on the server when compared to our previously fully centralized incentives. These facts illustrate the plausibility of our design choice: centralizing the incentive mechanism in order to increase resource availability in P2P content distribution.
